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Conversation and its Erosion into Discourse and Computation

Klaus Krippendorff

Introduction

In my answer to Ernst von Glasersfeld's (2008) question "Who conceives
Society?" I proposed a radically social constructivism (Krippendorff, 2008a)
that overcomes what I perceive to be an unfortunate cognitivism in von
Glasersfeld's, Heinz von Foerster's, and· Humberto Maturana's work. Since
then, I published two other papers on the subject. One (2008b) moves the
notion of human agency into the center of my project, focusing on its role in
conceptions of social organizations- a concept less grand than "society" and
one (2008c) teases out several reflexive turns that have grown in cybernetics
but cannot be subsumed by the epistemology of radical constructivism and
second-order cybernetics, which privileges observation and a representational
theory of language over participation in conversation and cooperative
constructions of reality. In all of these efforts, conversation has become the
starting point of my conceptualizations of being human. In this essay, I wish to
discuss what conversation entails, how it is maintained, and under which
conditions it degenerates into something else.
Since Martin Heidegger, many philosophers have based their work on
the contention that humans live in language. I concur with this proposition but
must warn that there are several' conceptions of language (Volosinov, 1986)
and it is important to be clear about the specific conception of language when
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subscribing to such a proposition. Linguistic conceptions of language are
largely due to Ferdinand de Saussure's (1916) unfortunate but consequential
distinction between "langue" and "parole." For him, langue, the French for
language, is the relatively enduring system of rules and conventions common
to all of its speakers, and parole, the French for speaking, is what speakers do
with language. The latter is considered full of idiosyncrasies, marred by
individual incompetencies, entirely situational, messy, difficult to study, and
hence excluded from the object that linguistics constructs and calls language.
Also, for Saussure, langue and parole is what individuals speak. The fact that
we speak in the expectation of being understood by others, in social relations

with others, not merely expressing our experiences to the world - interindividual relations - does not enter traditional linguistic inquiries, sociolinguistics nudging excepted. In my view, linguists study a convenient
abstraction from processes of conversations, purporting to be the systematic
and conventional structure that governs individual speakers. It construes that
abstraction as the government of individual speech.
For

me,

Maturana

and

Francisco

Varela's

(1980,

1987)

term

"languaging" or "the use of language" brings the linguist abstraction back to
where it is embodied, in real people speaking with each other. Languaging is a
process of mutual human engagement. It' is not just a biological capability.
Languaging has a history, developmentally, in the sense that individual humans
learn it from each other, etymologically in the sense that spoken utterances
and written words have lineages that go back to generations of uses by largely
unrecognized cultural ancestors, and ontogenetically, in the sense that it goes
hand in glove with-the evolution and use of cultural artifacts. Languaging is a
social or inter-personal phenomenon, not a cognitive one.
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For Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953; Schulte, 1992), language is a game we play
with each other, and the meaning of its words is the history of acquiring their
use. When we learn a language, we learn to coordinate ourselves with present
others. This is quite consistent with Maturana's (1988) conception of language
as the con-sensual coordination of con-sensual coordinations of actions. The
dash between "con" and "sensual" is mine and intended to highlight the jointly
sensing of (focusing on) something and each other by speakers, and to prevent
the common reading of "consensual" as relating to consensus or agreement.
Playing soccer, for example, requires much coordination among players
relative to a moving ball. But what makes handling that ball a soccer game has
much to do with the interpretation of written rules, for example, by referees,
declaring something to be a violation or a scored goal, and which team won.
I contend that Wittgenstein's choice of the game metaphor may not
have been an entirely happy one as it suggests language as a means of
accomplishing something, a tool, for example, to decide who won the game.
Surely, this is not what he implied. Rather, his language games do not need to
be finite and may well be ongoing, a "way of life" in which people have the
courage to change their being with each other. I have similar misgiving with
the idea of language as the coordination of coordinations of actions. Language
does not control anything. Speakers interface with each other and define
themselves interactively, not as individual actors, but as participants, acting
jointly (Shatter, 1993). Even in a soccer game, not all participants are eager to
be on the winning side of the game. Besides the two teams of players,
including their coaches, there are referees, sports enthusiasts, field owners,
and their employees whose diverse realities are necessary but not questioned
during a game. As Wittgenstein reminds us, using language does something. In
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the process of speaking, realities are cooperatively created and maintained in
which speakers constitutively participate in relation to each other. Human
relations,

soccer

games,

cities,

and

technologies

are

interactive

accomplishments, cognition playing always only a part in them. What
individual soccer players have in mind may well affect the outcome of the
game but does not determine its end.
In (2008c), I worked towards the conclusion that cybernetics is an

interdisciplinary discourse that brings radically reflexive realities into being,
which includes attention to a host of familiar constructions from feedback
loops, self-references, recursions, autonomies, to its own constructive use of
language. There I suggested that second-order cyberneticians do not go far

i
'

enough when they merely reflect on their observations, taking responsibility
for observing, constructing realities, and describing that process to others. The
idea that observers observe their observations abstracts individual capabilities
from the fabric of conversations in which observations become interindividually meaningful and constructions of reality become coordinated
among interlocutors. I am suggesting that the realities we say we see or think
we know are not mere cognitive constructions, they become intelligible and
are continually shaped in conversations. The point is that words do something
(Austin, 1962), organizations are performed in conversations (Krippendorff,
2008b), and theories can change the very world they claim to describe, right in
front of their speakers' eyes (Krippendorff, 2009:112-130) with reality
conforming

to

or

running

away

from

the

unreflected

belief

in

its

representation in language.
For this reason, I prefer not to ground my argument in radical
"!

constructivist conception of reality as cognitive construction, nor in its
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objectivist counterpart, that physical or biological reality affords (explains) our
perception. To me, physicists construct a universe for the sole convenience of
getting answers to their questions (Werner Heisenberg: "What we observe is
not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning"). Physics
becomes foundational when insisting that the reality it constructs underlies
everything else. Similarly, biology becomes foundational when claiming that
the living systems that biologists construct underlie all human sciences.
Foundationalisms are often maintained by denying the discourses in which
they are claimed. All Questions and answers, truth claims, theories, and
conceptions are articulated in conversations and not realizing them as
arguments or claims diverts attention from how realities are socially
constructed to what results from that process, from what we humans create to
what we dare not to question. The conception of causality, for example, the
backbone of physical explanations, has no place for human agency. The
conception of autopoiesis, basic to biology, is entirely optional to how beings
organize their lives. Finally, cognitive autonomy, which underlies radical
constructivists'

explanations

of

human

cognitive

abilities,

is

an

epiphenomenon of conversations and other forms of interaction. Cognitive

''

phenomena cannot be observed, least of all located in someone's brain. They
become

manifest

in

institutionalized

vocabularies

that

psychological

1

experimenters can elicit from their subjects - experiences, understandings,

y

conceptual models, intentions, and other individual abilities - omitting the

s

essentially linguistic, social, interactive, embodied, and ongoing nature of the
· situation in which data emerge as co-constructed.
In his paper "Producing a Cognition", Charles Antaki (2006) gives a good

:s

example of an interview that is designed to test the cognitive ability of
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respondents. It starts with an interviewee's denial to know where his money
comes from. But after interacting with the interviewer, the interviewee ends
up realizing or constructing an answer that satisfied both the interviewer and

:I

the respondent. It demonstrates conclusively that cognition is co·nstructed
interactively and in language. Here, cognitio'n is housed neither in the mind of
the interviewee nor in that of the interviewer.
I am

suggesting that all

sciences are

practiced

in

constrained

conversations, in discourse as I will detail below. They create and rearticulate
their objects so as to be observable and interpretable within their respective
discourse communities. Contrary to convenient but questionable beliefs that
their objects precede attention to them, I contend that the realities the
sciences describe are the artifacts of constrained conversational practices by
their communities. Almost everything we think we know, plan, build, and use
emerges from disciplined verbal and non-verbal interactions.
It makes sense, therefore, to ground this essay in where questions are
asked, truth claims are negotiated, and realities are co-constructed, that is, in

conversations. This is where physical, biological, cognitive, linguistic and
sociological realities are created and take hold of the imaginations of diverse
communities

whose

members

listen

to,

live

with,

and

enact

these

conversational realities. I am assuming that we humans, like all animals, are
constituted in togetherness as a condition of our existence, not in biological or
cognitive functioning. For some species, togetherness is short lived, consisting
of coincidental coupling, birthing, and temporal caring. For us, humans,
togetherness is richer. It involves interactively coordinated speaking during
which we are consta·ntly reminded that our engagement with each other has a
history that precedes our participation in it and this history inevitably

134

resonates in ongoing conversations. Conversation is one explanation that
constitutes itself in practicing human togetherness.
The following two sections describe conversation from two contrasting
positions. The first applies von Foerster and Maturana's variously articulated
conception of a standard scientific observer (here of conversation) whose aim
is to be conscious of his or her acts of observing and describing his or her
observations/constructions to others. The second takes the position of a
participant in conversations whose competencies reside in contributing to
what is happening there. The difference between these two positions is not
found in the difference between objective and subjective accounts of the same
phenomena but between outsider and insider accounts. All accounts occur in
conversations and are offered in the first position by one observer (of
conversations) to a community of other observers, and in the second position
by participants in the very process to be accounted for. I am using the second
section not only as a critique of the first, showing the epistemological
limitations of celebrating observers and observations, but also as a reference
to what happens when conversation degenerates into something else.

Conversation observed

Morphologically, "con-" means together, joint, or among, and "-versation" has
many roots, from making "verse" out of experiences as poets do, being
"conversant" in a subject matter, to a "version," translation or interpretation
of something, including of reality. The Oxford English Dictionary (1991:868)
traces "Conversation" to the 1ih century and gives its earliest meaning as "The
action of living or having one's being in a place of or among persons" and "The
action of consorting or having dealings with others; living together; commerce,
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intercourse, society, intimacy. In the 16th century conversation became
"Interchange of thoughts and words; familiar discourse or talk." This
etymology suggests the meaning of conversation to be remarkably stable. Its
overriding use is a way of being together in talk and interaction serves me well.
Contrasting dialogue with writing, I suggested: Everything said is said in the

"
expectation of being understood by an addressee. Everything
heard as being
said is taken as having been said by one person to another. Unde~standing
does not need to be mutual and shared, but to be complementary in how it is
performed (Krippendorff, 2009:159). Minimally, conversation requires two
participants in interlacing expectations. Charles Goodwin (1981:4), citing Erving
Goffman (1976), differentiates three listeners to talk. Those who overhear a
conversation without being part of it and without the expectation or ability to
respond, those who are part of a conversation and (in case of three or more
participants) are addressed by the speaker and expected to respond, or not

addressed and not expected to respond. Goffman and Goodwin thought of
overhearers as casual bystanders. I am including as bystanders the observers
of conversations, for example, through a one-way mirror, the listeners of wire
tapped telephone conversations, the viewers of verbal interactions on a movie
screen, and, most important here, the conversation analysts, typically working
from transcripts of naturally occurring talk. The latter are scientific observers
of conversation and I maintain their view is necessarily unlike the view of
i
:, !

involved participants.
As a scientific observer, overhearing and recording conversations from
their outside, Robert Nofsinger (1991) considers conversations as:

•

Mundane activities among those observed together. Everyone is able to
engage in conversation with others without specialized knowledge,
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preparation or equipment. This observation may need to be qualified by
noting that conversation is learned. Mothers incessantly talk to their
babies, initially pleased to get at least a smile in response. It is not clear
how babies or children listen, but in time, their participation becomes
richer and entirely natural or mundane. Then Nofsinger's observation
applies.

•

Common occurrences. Conversations are observed everywhere, at home,
at work, while shopping, in public places, on the telephone, and between
waking up in the morning and exchanging intimacies with a partner at
night. While mostly taking place among acquaintances, conversations also
occur among strangers as when waiting in line for a cashier or in a doctor's
office.

•

Interactively unfolding in time. Participants take turns and respond to each
other's utterances. A conversation essentially is a sequential activity. It
creates its own history. This history can be recorded, videotaped,
transcribed, and examined in detail, providing analyzable data.

•

Locally managed. During the course of a conversation, participants
themselves determine who speaks, how long, and in which order.
Responsibility for maintaining a conversation is distributed among those
present.

•

Accompanied by other activities. Participants are not merely saying
something to each other when they talk. They are also doing something at
the same time. Activities may include non-verbal expressions - gestures,
eye contact variations in voice - but they also establish relationships
among speakers and coordinate parallel activities. Conversations between
the pilot and copilot direct an airplane's flight; within a team of designers
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result in a novel technology; between therapist and a client produce new
realities, ostensively for the client but in fact for both; among business
partners shape actionable agreements; or among the employees of a social
organization determine what that organization is and how everyone
contributes to it. Conversations coordinate the realities of everyday life.
Other scholars consider conversations as:

•

Extendable to mediated activities. Although speaking a language is
acquired in bodily presence of others in conversation, once learned,
conversations

can

continue

through

interactive

media,

between

participants out of sight. Exchanging written letters, once the only form of
mediated conversation, is being replaced by telephone conversations,

i '

online discussions, email, and texting. While all mediated conversations
omit some features of face-to face conversations - sight in telephone
conversations, identity in some text-based internet discussions - they
always extend desirable dimensions -

distance. Yet, in

mediated

conversations, participants are aware of each other.
Academic interests in conversations assume conversations to be
I

•

Analyzab/e and theorizable, usually from recordings and transcripts that
allow the conversation analyst to examine and reexamine the data for
patterns that may otherwise escape even the most attentive listening, or

: !

in the case of mediated conversations, casual reading.
Theories based on such data always are and cannot be anything other than the
,, i

theories of observers, not of the observed participants - unless the latter
articulate their theory in use, which is rare. However, the position of observers
and participants should not be confused on epistemological grounds.

Also,

1.1.

theories always reflect the disciplinary interests of theorists in a limited aspect
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of the available data.

For example, therapists typically look for clues to a

diagnosis of their clients' mental problems, ignoring everything else, including
their own creative contributions to this end. Employers may examine interview
data to predict whether an interviewee will fit their job description, and
cognitive scientists select from the verbal interactions what allows them to
infer what is going on in participants' mind. Conversation analysts are not
immune to such limitations either when seeking to invent rules that could
explain the organization of talk and exchange of written messages, except that
their theories tend not to aim at generalizations but are satisfied with
moment-to-moment explanations.
It is often taken for granted that conversation analysts can hardly
proceed without speaking the language of the participants in observed
conversations, nor can they succeed without conversational experiences on
their own. Even the transcripts they prepare are cultural artifacts that speak to
the analysts' competencies to engage in and write down what they observe.
Reliance on such data questions the detachment that conversation analysts
seek to project in their analyses and explanations.
Insightful analysts may well have been part of the very conversations
they subsequently analyze. Goodwin (1981), for example, taped many birthday
parties and gatherings among friends, bringing insider experiences into his
analysis. But being compelled to demonstrate the validity of a conversation
analysis in terms of quotes from transcripts or clips from video recordings
encourages explanations of sequential interactions, turn taking, and how
categories of utterances follow each other. Such sequential data lead some
analysts to causal explanations, for example, John Searle (1969) and other
speech act theorists invoke "illocutionary forces" to explain what speech acts
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do, or Gordon Pask (1975, 1976) relies on computational explanations of

!

!

conversations. Such explanations make sense from the position of an observer
who has no direct access to the choices that participants exercise and what

I

motivated them. All they can work from is how observations follow each other.
While acknowledging local management as a defining.feature of conversations,

I
h

what conversation analysts easily overlook is their inability to account for what

I

is happening inside conversations. Self-organizing systems, by definition,

r
t

develop their own identities, their own realities, and their own meanings for
what occurs within their boundaries. For outsiders, it is extraordinarily difficult,
perhaps impossible, to explain why participants say what they say and how a
conversation is developing the way it does, except for the above mentioned
possibility of asking questions of the participants, in effect intervening in the
conversation of interest, thus bringing their own conversational experiences

I

into the very conversation to be analyzed.

I

l

By analyzing transcripts of conversations, conversation analysts notice
patterns that may mean nothing to participants inside conversations. To claim
that

participants

in

conversation

are

unaware

of the

patterns that

conversation analysts are "discovering," or more correctly said, "constructing,"
is epistemologically untenable- unless analysts step out of their observer role,
explore their hypotheses with the participants in a conversation, and thus
become conversationally involved, abandoning their preferred observer role.
In the social sciences, participant accounts largely are considered unreliable
and not born out by observational facts. Preservation of objectivity was one

I

,,,,

reason for linguistics to exclude parole and conversations from their object of
study. Conversation analysts are not committed to the abstract-objectivist
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notions of language (Volosinov, 1986) that linguists pursue but also shy away
from becoming conversationally involved in their object of analysis.
To appreciate the severe limitations of understanding conversations by
overhearing or observing conversations from their outside, let me now
describe, to the extent possible, conversation from within the process, as a
participant.

Authentic conversation

In existential philosophy, authenticity has to do with being true to one's self
despite pressures of society to be otherwise. There, authenticity is celebrated
as an individualist ideal that denies the conversational reality of being human. I
am using authenticity here to refer to a pleasure of participating in
togetherness in which one is free to speak for oneself, not in the name of
absent others, not under pressure to say things one does not believe in, and
not having to hide something for fear of being reprimanded or excluded from
further conversations. But I will be more specific than that.
Authentic conversation is not easily if at all identifiable from its outside.
How would an observer access someone's construction in progress, why
something is said, and what is not being said? Questions of this kind should not
be dismissed as being subjective. Inasmuch as participants in conversations can
be asked and may be willing to account for their feelings, the act of making
them public where they can be dealt with in the very conversations that elicits
them,

renders them

inter-subjectively verifiable.

One

is reminded

of

Wittgenstein's argument against private language. Participant accounts are not
only richer in meaning and closer to what is going on inside a conversation
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than their observational manifestations, but also more predictable of how a
conversation unfolds- at least to the satisfaction of the participants.

Participants in authentic conversations - whether as speakers or
listeners, and in case of the latter, whether addressed and expected to
respond or waiting for their turn- may experience conversations as:

•

Occurring in the presence of addressable and responsive individuals. In
authentic conversations, participants distinguish themselves and each
other by the contributions they make to them. The act of distinguishing
oneself is public. It does not impose identities on others, which is what
observers are destined to do. When participants cannot be seen as
addressable or the source of their voices cannot be distinguished, for
example, when in a large and anonymous crowd, conversation is no longer
authentic.

•

Maintaining

mutual

understanding.

In

conversations,

mutuality,

agreement, and coordination of understanding and acting are of central
concern for all participants. However, since cognition cannot be observed
I

I

and nobody can compare their own understanding with that of others, in
conversations, understanding or the lack of it, is performative and evident
in certain speech acts, such as "I understand", "I agree" or "tell me more".
Here, understanding does not mean similarity or sharing, its affirmation
constitutes an invitation to go on, including to other subjects.
Observers, by contrast, are effectively excluded from the possibilities of
checking their understanding of what they overhear against the performative
understanding among participants in conversation. In this respect, analysts of
transcripts of conversations or written exchanges are literally 'out of the loop',
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isolated, and responsive at most to their scientific community of equally
detached observers.

•

Self-organizing and constituted in the contributions their participants make
to each other. Conversations are communicationally closed. They are not
abstracted from anything. They are embodied in real participants' talking
and listening to each other, responding to what they heard, and acting
accordingly. The identities of conversations -

dinner conversations,

political deliberations in a convenient place, therapeutic sessions, focus
group discussions, business meeting, or design projects - emerges from
talk and text generated within that conversation. With the emergence of
conversational identities comes the feeling of being part of it, referring to
its participants by the inclusive "we." How the responsibility to maintain
the flow of conversational moves is distributed among participants and the
direction in which a conversation is going is always uncertain - save for
one's own contribution. Among participants, this uncertainty is not a
deficiency, however. Participants trust each other to make sense of what is
said.
Observers who seek to understand a conversation from a recording of what
happened, looking at it from a God's eye view, cannot possibly appreciate the
feeling of being part of it, the feeling of being able to shape an always evolving
conversation, and the feeling of trusting each other to maintain the flow. As
Michael Billig (2006) noted, we have a rich vocabulary of inner processes feelings, thoughts, attitudes, experiences, memories, and reasons- in terms of
which psychologists construct the cognitive processes of their interest without
being observable. However, it is because the conversational use of these
words is public and coordinated with other speakers of a language that they
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become meaningful in conversations, not as description of individual states but
as performing certain speech acts.

•

Intuitive,. not rule governed. Authentic conversations are embodied
practices.

Turn

taking,

topic

switching,

coordination

of

reality

constructions is natural, requiring no reflection, no preparation, no special
training - as Nofsinger said, notwithstanding the fact that children, born
into a community, need to learn joining its conversations. Children do not
learn rules, however; and ,.then apply them. They learn to interact with
others by speaking much like how they see and hear others interact with
them. Authentic conversations do not follow rules, they give birth to
further conversations. Only after sufficient conversational competencies
are acquired is it possible to talk of improper practices - "do not
interrupt", "don't be rude" or "listen!" from which conversational
conventions may emerge. But authentic conversations may go on without
them.
Conversation theorists may well draw useful distinctions in the transcripts of
conversations, for example, by analyzing conversational triples and adjacency
pairs, formulating and testing hypotheses about how natural conversations are
organized (Goodwin, 1981), postulating conversational maxims (Grice, 1975,
1978), or theorizing a universal pragmatics for ideal speech situations

!.:-.
i-:

i

(Habermas, 1970, 2001), but all of these grand theoretical precepts are the
constructions by and for outsiders of conversations.
Conversation analysts have the tendency of claiming that participants
implicitly follow the rules they have invented. This claim is epistemologically
preposterous, however. Drawing on Sigmund Freud, Billig (2006) makes a
useful distinction between the unconscious and the preconscious. The former
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is an observer's construction of cognition that is inaccessible to an observed
individual (and often related to repression). The latter is an observer's
construction of what that individual does not attend to at the moment, takes
for granted while conversing with others. But from the perspective of social
construction,

there

is

also

the

possibility

that

conversation

analytic

vocabularies enter a conversation and start coordinating participants' talk
whether of cognitive conditions or conversational rules. In other words, while
the results of conversation analysis may not have anything to do with how
conversation is practiced, teaching conversation theoretical explanations may
divert practitioners' attention from what they had been doing naturally.
•

Dialogically equal. By dialogical equality I mean that every participant in a
conversation has the possibility of contributing to it. Nobody feels
excluded. Every contribution, even silence, is respected and appropriately
responded to.

Indeed, participation is rarely observed equal. Some participants inevitably
speak more than others do, leading to the claim of power inequalities
operating within observed conversation. Moreover, participants usually have
unequal resources (experiences) to contribute. Turn taking is inherently
asymmetrical. However, interpretations of observed differences in frequencies
as indicators of inequality may not be valid to insiders to whom unequal
experiences may not be detrimental to authentic conversations, more likely,
but a way to keep a conversation alive. Even without making an observable
contribution, the perception of being able to contribute when the opportunity
arises and be accepted for what one says is all that matters. Needless to say
dialogical equality is not observable from outside a conversation. Participants

II
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may not speak about its presence either but are most likely notice and
articulate its absence.

•

Creating possibilities of participation. Conversations may well take place
while doing a job. But besides correlations with a purposive activity,
conversations are inherently self-motivating, creative of newness, offering
participants possibilities to contribute, and realize themselves in the
contributions they and others make to the process. One obvious example
of opening possibilities of participation is to raise questions not previously
answered, inviting addressees to construct mutually acceptable answers.
Conversational possibilities expand when participants assure each other
that their contributions are important, being understood, and protective of
each other's faces (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Creating and maintaining
possibilities for others, relates to von Foerster's (1981:308) ethical
imperative: "Act always so as to increase the number of choices." Here, I
am embedding his imperative in the context of social interactions. Socially
relevant choices, not their numbers, are the gifts that partners in
communication can offer each other (Krippendorff, 2009:34).

Obviously, possibilities can be created, pondered, exhausted, and constrained,
but not observed. It should also be noted that not all questions may invite
participation, as I shall discuss below.

•

Irreversible, progressive, and unique. For participants, conversations never
repeat themselves. Each turn is experienced as unique; each utterance
reveals its speakers' shifting perspectives. As Heraclitus suggested, "you
cannot step twice in the same river." Participants have numerous
conversational moves available to alert each other of redundant threads:
"here we go again!" "didn't you already tell that story", "old news", etc.
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Indeed, it makes no sense to repeat stories unless they had been forgotten
or decisions unless they were not followed up or previously undone.
For conversation analysts, each transcript may well be unique as well.
However, scientific analysis calls for the identification of recurrent pattern and
generalizations at the cost of excluding the very uniqueness to which the
participants in conversations respond. Observers tend to be blind to the
unique contributions made in conversations. Participants tend to be blind to
the repetitions they take for granted. Evidently, observers and participants
construct realities that are orthogonal to each other but not incompatible.

•

Coordinating constructions of reality. Conversations always leave artifacts
behind, minimally the memories of their own history. Other artifacts
include the always evolving relationships among participants. But most
important are the changes that participants introduce into the world while
being in and after participating in conversations: decisions with practical
consequences, institutionalizations of procedures, projects, designs or
texts, and realizations of diverse technologies. Rarely do these artifacts
correspond to any one individual's cognition. Participants supplement each
other's contributions (Gergen, 1994). Indeed, furniture, cars, computers,
the internet and cities are designed in the course of many conversations,
having long histories with changing participants but a common thread.
Conceptions of these artifacts need not be shared and mostly cannot be
articulated in full by any one individual but may complement each other in
the interactions that set these artifacts in motion.

Conversation theorists cannot achieve such coordinations for their theories unless they join the conversation they are theorizing and become active
participants, no longer observers. Similarly, theorists of technology are
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comfortable in describing the histories of technological developments, but
rarely appreciate the multiple conversational grounds of such developments,
much less dare to forecast technological developments. The belief in
technological determinism is an extreme case of denying the role of language
and social interaction that drive such developments.
•

Continuable in principle. From the perspective of external observers,
conversations may be short, such as between occupants of neighboring
seats on a city bus, which terminate when they no longer sit next to each
other, or long, such as between teenage friends who talk for hours on the
telephone. For observers, both examples take place in measurably finite
time. But for participants, time may not matter but the possibility of their
continuation at a later time, at a different place, and perhaps including
new participants, regardless of what happened between separate
encounters. When children move out of their family, for instance, going to
college, and stay in touch with their family members and friends by
telephone, email, or text messaging, they continue to weave the
conversational realities they had started long ago albeit by different
means, across geographical distances, and under continuously changing
circumstances. Conversations can terminate when they degenerate into
other forms of interactions, incompatible with the above, and in the
extreme, when violence enters, which is a categorically different way of
being together.

Evidently, there are vast differences between how participants see themselves
in authentic conversations and what outside observers, conversation analysts,
can record, analyze, ·articulate, and theorize. The two positions are consensually different, distinguished by unlike epistemologies, unlike relationships

148

to their objects of attention, and unlike experiences with the subject matter of
talk and written exchanges. I am not devaluing the position of conversation
analyst, but wish to highlight that their reality constructions necessarily differ
from the realities of those conversationally involved with each other.

Accountability and possibilities of repairs

The above depicts conversations as self-organizing and unproblematic verbal
and non-verbal interactions among participants, constructing coordinated
realities along the. way. Authentic conversation is typical among trusting
friends but also among strangers who, having nothing to loose, and feel alive in
each other's presence. I do not expect participants to describe what authentic
conversation entails -as I tried above - but become aware when disruptions
of it are experienced.
In everyday life, people do not always respond in perfect alignment of
each other. We say things that may not be understood as intended, interrupt
someone's turn, offend someone without wanting to, or talk too much and
thereby preempt others from speaking their mind. Besides such unintended
disruption of unproblematic interactions, we know of systematic and
institutionalized disruptions which we may notice when they occur but fail to
address for a variety of reasons. I maintain that conversational competencies
include ample possibilities to repair problematic conversations within them.
Whether or not we utilize these linguistic resources and how aware we are of
these possibilities is a big question I cannot answer here. Often it is only after
encountering the efforts of others to repair our conversations with them that
we become aware ·of their problematic nature and their deviation from
authentic conversation - without implying the ability to articulate just how a
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conversation got astray. Possibly the most important linguistic resource for
repairing disruptions of authentic conversations is accountability.
I contend that everything said is said not only in the expectation of being
understood by addressees, but also in the expectation of being held
accountable for what was said or done. As John Shatter (1984, 1993) suggests,
speakers tend to articulate their contributions to a conversation not merely in
response to other speakers but also with possible accounts in mind in case
their contributions are challenged. The process of holding participants
accountable may be initiated by noting an infelicitous, untoward, or
problematic

conversational

move,

action,

or sequence

of

exchanges.

Expressing dis-ease with someone's contribution - sometimes called metacommunication- amounts to a momentary disruption of that flow and implies
I'
,,

a request for an account by the presumed source of that dis-ease. Requests for
an account may also be made directly: "Why did you say that?" "What do you
want to accomplish with that proposal? "Why do you come so late?" The
account subsequently given is then evaluated and either accepted or rejected,
and in case of the latter, a new account may be requested, until the issue is
resolved (Buttny, 1993).
The most typical accounts are explanations, justifications, excuses (Mills,
1940; Scott & Lyman, 1968), and apologies. The interactions they set in motion
are part of the conversation. They differ from the unproblematic flow of a

·.!
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conversation by focusing on the interaction in question, not on what they
construct.

•

Explanations are least disruptive of conversations. They respond to
assertions like "I· don't understand", "I am not following you", and
questions like "can you clarify?" or "what do you mean by that?"
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Explanations, once accepted as making sense, have the effect of
coordinating participants' understanding performatively and bringing a
conversation

back

to

an

unproblematic

flow.

Good

explanations

rearticulate or expand what had been said in terms compatible to
listeners' background of understanding.

•

Justifications, acknowledge a speaker's agency in an actual or anticipated
happening, and respond to expressed doubts in the merit of that
happening. Justifications may be defensive when responding to challenges
or preparatory when actions are proposed with the intent to seek
approval. Often justifications are used to enroll listeners into the speaker's
project

(Krippendorff,

2008b).

Once

justifications

are

accepted,

conversation can proceed to other topics.

•

Excuses, by contrast, deny a speaker's or actor's agency, intention, or
involvement in what happened and offer grounds for not being responsible
for it. Typical excuses Cjre appeals to external causes, lack of knowledge,
accidents, being under the influence of drugs, or having acted on order of a
superior. The latter may shift blame to someone else, which is a common
diversion. If accepted, excuses render speakers blameless and enable them
to continue their participation in the conversation. Excuses rely on
narratives that are intended to be compelling, not necessarily true. Excuses
do not change the condition for which they are offered.

•

Apologies admit responsibility for an offensive conversational move or
action, express regret, and imply the promise not to repeat it in the future.
Unlike excuses, apologies admit the actor's agency. Accepting an apology
forgives the perpetrators of offensive conversational moves or actions and
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is a way to continue the conversation in the hope that the offense will not
recur.

Shatter's (1984, 1993) observation that all speakers talk in the expectation of
being held accountable by listeners for what they say and do, applies to the act
of giving accounts as well. Accounts too are always articulated in the hope of
I

being accepted and only those are offered that have that chance. Although
accounts may well appeal to general conventions - rationality, common
benefits, individual values, or established practices - such conventions are

i .·

effective only in the very conversations in which participants are willing to let
them stand. Inasmuch as the mutual acceptance of practices of living together
is a matter of ethics by definition, successful accounts provide narratives that
participants in conversation consider ethical. Thus, in repairing problematic
conversations, conversation-specific ethical narratives are proposed, tested,
and accepted, i.e., narratives that participants can live with and find no reason
to object to. The ethics that emerges in repaired conversations has two
remarkable features. It is rarely generalizable to all conversations- effectively
denying

their

universality,

for

example,

the

universal

pragmatics

of

communication proposed by Habermas' (1970)- and it cannot be represented
by any one observer or participant's cognitive construction. Conversational
Ethical realities are performed in conversations or interactively constructed.
Accounts may be personal, "I was angry", informational, "I didn't know
that", related to efficiency, "this is alii could afford", ethical, "I didn't want to
hurt her", moral, "everyone does it", pragmatic, "it worked in the past", or
institutional, "this is the approved procedure."

;'I,,
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Problematic conversations can be considered repaired when they resume their
natural flow. However, conversations are not machines that can be fixed by
replacing defective parts. Successful repairs have the potential of leaving
memorable residues behind, an awareness of what happened and how it was
resolved. Such residues may become part of the history of a conversation and
direct that conversation's future along paths not taken absent prior repairs.
Therefore, a history of successful repairs holds the seeds of conventional
accounting practices in terms of which future problematic conversational
moves may become explained, justified, excused, or apologized for. Thus,
unless the history of repairs is forgotten, repaired conversation may no longer
be quite authentic and I would argue this condition to be most common in
naturally occurring conversations.

Degeneration of conversation

While language always provides ample resources for repairing untoward
conversational moves or actions, this is not to say that all disruptions of the
flow

of interactions

are

repaired

indeed.

Not

repairing

problematic

conversations is not limited to children who are in the process of developing
accounting competencies. It applies to competent speakers as well. Failing to
repair conversations that turned problematic has two important social
consequences. On the one hand, participants who do not hold each other
accountable for what they say or do, whether for reasons of expedience or
fear of reprisals, grant implicit permission to continue the untoward practices,
which can lead to their tacit legitimization. On the other hand, participants
who refuse to give adequate accounts when requested of them, claim
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exceptional privileges in effect, which can lead to the institution of inequalities
and violate the dialogical equality that authentic conversation requires.
There may be passable and unfortunate reasons for not practicing
accountability. Temporarily suspending conversation to get something more
important accomplished might be considered reasonable - as long as this
suspension is temporary and mutually consented to. Entrapment of one by
another - threads of exclusion from a conversation, induction of fear of
retribution, and exercising authority -

is always unfortunate because

acquiescence inevitably creates burdensome interpersonal relationships that
are incompatible with authentic conversation. The unwillingness of repairing
problematic conversations is the root cause of conversations to descend into
other forms of interaction, as I shall exemplify below. The results of such
degenerations are the conventional starting point of sociological abstractions
without adequate reflection on their roots in conversations.
There are innumerably many ways a conversation can degenerate into
other forms of social interactions. I can offer only a few examples.

•

Physical constraints. Most benign and not entirely social in nature are
physical constraints. Conversations become increasingly difficult when
noise competes with participants' ability to listen to each other's voices, or
when the number of participants grows too large for speakers to address
individual participants or to distinguishing individual voices, for example at
mass rallies, political demonstrations, or public performances. In such
situations, participants acquire collective identities that divide participants,
say, into performers and audiences or demonstrators and police.

•

Dialogical

inequalities.

Most

obviously,

authentic

conversation

degenerates by tolerating dialogical inequalities. Interruptions of a
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speaker's turn can happen carelessly, but they also may be part of
accepted discourse practices. For example, it is well known that men
interrupt women more often than in reverse. Numerous explanations have
been suggested, including in terms of a prevailing sense of patriarchy.
More clearly explainable dialogical inequalities occur at board meetings.
Authentic conversation among equals disappears as soon as the CEO or a
person in charge of the meeting enters. Such situations are often explained
in terms of unequal distribution of power. Power, however, is not what
superiors have and subordinates lack. It is not measurable by unequal
access of material resources but manifests itself in the unwillingness to
hold authorities accountable for what they say or do, and its complement,
in the refusal to provide accounts when requested

(Krippendorff,

2009:131-155). Power arises when accountability is not exercised and
subsequent interactions are tolerated.
Therapists have sometimes been characterized as conversation managers,
which makes therapy different from conversation. Managing focus groups or
group discussions, for example, by instructing participants to list their ideas on
a predefined issue, putting them on public display, and then proceeding to
group them gives the impression of dialogic equality by granting every
participant a voice while leaving the moderator in charge of the process.
Widely practiced in marketing research and used as a qualitative method for
generating data in the social sciences, such methods elicit information that is
biased by the management of the group interactions, revealing something very
different from what people would express in unconstrained conversations.

•

Inauthentic questions. I suggested that asking questions with unknown
answers creates possibilities for participants to choose their contributions
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and experience respect when their answers are acknowledged by
responding to them. But questions may be inauthentic as well. Knowledge
tests, for example, whether administered in educational settings, aptitude
tests for hiring employees, or scientific research, are not geared to
understanding but to establish a respondent's comprehension, the criteria
for which reside in the questioner. Asking questions for which the answers
are known is consistent with conceptualizing communication as the
accurate transmission of information from one mind to another - a
process that is institutionalized in many educational and administrative
· situations, which have nothing to do with conversation.
In public opinion research, interviewees are asked to commit themselves to
answer an interviewer's questions, and to give up their conversationally
expected ability to ask questions of their own. In this genre of social research,
questions are standardized for all interviewees, asked according to a schedule,
and a prepared set of answers conform to the interest to the sponsors of the
research. Whatever results from such interviews has less to do with what
people talk among themselves than with what sponsors want to hear
(Krippendorff, 2005), a seriously biased investigative technique. Talk show
hosts on radio or television are notoriously in charge of what counts as
appropriate to the institutionalized genre they enact. They define the topic,
ask the questions, interrupt as they see fit, including signaling the audience to
applaud. Talk show guests tend to go along with these inauthenticities for the
publicity this affords them on a show.

•

Institutionalized interactions. Mariaelena Bartesaghi (2009a) studying
therapists' use of. questions during therapeutic sessions, found less obvious
inauthenticities. The therapeutic use of questions may give clients the
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impression that the therapist is genuinely interested in their problems, but
systematically directs the clients' answers to where therapists wants to go
with them. She defines therapy as institutionalized form of interaction.
Therapy includes avoiding answering clients' questions, for instance:
Client: "Why can't I see you on Monday?" Therapist: "That seems to
disturb you, doesn't it?" (Lakoff, 1990:69).

•

Referring to participants in terms of stereotypical categories. When
addressing each other or some participants in social categories, for
example, as a (typical) woman, black, French, gay, mental patient, catholic,
or consumer, the ensuing interaction is no longer among mutually
respecting individuals but between social categories in terms of which
participants are expected to reply (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). It would be
difficult to hold categories accountable for what their members say and
do.

Similarly,

when

participants

in

conversations come

to

divide

themselves into opposing camps with ideological, party political, or ethnic
labels, for example, into progressive and conservative politicians, often
resulting in the use of plural pronouns- the collective "we" versus "they"
-

communication

becomes interactions among publically identified

collectivities and conversation is at best a wrong metaphor. Party politics
attest to perfectly reasonable individuals adopting ideological voices.
Even deliberatively avoiding public stereotypes can degrade authentic
conversation. John Jackson (2008) explores the unintended consequences of
political correctness in the United States. By confining the use of racial
stereotypes to conversations in the privacy of one's home, public discourse
becomes disingenuous and the realities it constructs schizophrenic, not
resolving the racial tension that political correctness was thought to alleviate.

i
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This phenomenon also exemplifies how the invocation of normative theories

'I

about proper talk in public can destroy the authenticity of conversation.

I

•

Institutionalizing realities. Bartesaghi (2009b) identified several strategies
that therapists apply to establish their authority vis-a-vis their clients.
Some authority is already presupposed in the very act of clients seeking
therapeutic advice. But in therapy sessions, this authority needs to be
realized in talk. Therapeutic authority derives largely from using a
vocabulary that is institutionalized in therapeutic discourse in which
therapists claim expertise. Therapists are trained to reframe clients'
personal

narratives

in

professional

terms,

constructing

a

psychotherapeutic reality for them that therapists can treat with the
institutional resources they command and clients are lacking. This practice
renders clients as incompetent narrators of their own world. Bartesaghi
made three important observations. The therapists she observed managed
to prevent being held accountable to their clients by hiding behind the
professional community of therapists, referring to themselves in terms of
the collective "we," having "years of experiences," and professional
affiliations. That community is physically absent from the therapeutic
session, channeled into the conversation by the therapist, giving the client
no chance to address it. By applying institutionally established therapeutic
theories to the social life of clients - theories of the clients' mental and
emotional states they are not expected to know - client accounts are
rendered flawed. This gives therapists the justification to replace clients'

narratives, feelings, and social problems by institutional accounts that
enable treatment·as individuals by therapeutic means.
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Therapeutic discourse is not the only discourse that constructs institutional

realities clients are asked to accept on the therapists' authority and with their
help. Scientists too tend to claim possession of the instruments for establishing
objective reality that laypersons need to accept on account of the scientific
authority articulating its truths. Teachers assume their authority vis-a-vis their
students by claiming to have valuable knowledge that students need to
acquire. Literary scholars presume the ability to interpret texts in ways
untrained readers cannot and authors may not be aware of. For example, Paul
Ricoeur's (1970) 'hermeneutic of suspicion' insists on characterizing authors as
hiding their agenda behind their writing, which has given literary scholars the
professional license to construct what could underlie a text regardless of what
its author say it means. In effect, this scholarship thrives on institutionalizing
what has been called conspiracy theory. It permits.scholars not to listen how
others -

readers and authors -

interpret the text they are analyzing.

Conspirators must, by definition, deny being one. It follows that an author's
denial of the suspected intentions can be interpreted as evidence for the
validity of the suspicion - a cognitive trap. One cannot converse with
institutionalized realities, only with people willing to consider them as mere
hypotheses, which is what social constructivism advocates.
Not confining accountability to those present in conversations is a premise of
sociological theorizing. Besides what I mentioned above, there are at least
three ways this can happen and it would be important to recognize the
linguistic ground, as Habermas (2001) does, making sociology possible.

•

Speaking for absent others. When therapists rearticulate their client's
stories in therapeutic terms, therapists and clients are at least co-present.
It is conceivable, therefore, that they could hold each other accountable
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should the evolving conversation go astray. Even institutionalized realities
can be contested, although I am told that clients in therapy rarely ever do
this in their sessions, which is not to rule out the possibility of expressing
their misgivings in conversations with trusted friends. However, when
speaking for absent others, speakers usurp the voices of individuals who,
perhaps conveniently excluded from a conversation, can neither be
questioned within that conversation nor be held accountable for their
views as channeled into a conversation by one participant. Noble intents
notwithstanding, speaking for the poor, oppressed, minorities, victims of
crime, or even for familiar acquaintances is a discourse strategy in Which
speakers claim to have more voices than their own. When compellingly
asserted, this gives speakers rhetorical strengths over those who cannot
claim such backing. Reporting rumors or something overheard may not
weigh much, but claiming to speak for one's boss during a contentious
meeting can converts a conversation among equals into a game of
usurped, claimed, perhaps invented voices, no longer among authentic
participants.

•

Speaking

as

representatives

of others:

individuals,

organizations,

movements, or governments. Lawyers represent their clients in court
mainly because untrained individuals believe they do not have the knowhow to navigate themselves through the legal system. In taking on a case,
lawyers translate their client's stories into legally valid narratives that a
court is designed to handle and to which clients are asked to submit in fear
of failing. In this process, clients become legal categories - plaintiffs,
defendants, or witnesses- whose roles are circumscribed by being treated
as their category and forced to respond accordingly. Or, politicians in
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democratic governments often face the difficult choice between speaking
their conscience or in the name of the constituencies that elected them.
The latter has the advantage of giving those with larger constituencies
more clout and affords them to defer voting until after consulting with
their constituency. In all of these cases, interactions are constrained by the
process of representation. Therefore, a parliament is not a place for
conversations but for institutionalized debates, public posturing, behind
door negotiations, compromises, and voting in the name of absent others.

•

Speaking as occupants of an office. In social organizations, members are
assigned to offices that serve particular functions with responsibilities for
coordinating the work of subordinates. Occupants of an office dedicate all
communications to the purpose of that office, speak from that position,
not for themselves, and expect all subordinates to be accountable to them,
without challenging their position. The transitivity of such asymmetrical
accounting practices creates and maintains organizational hierarchies, such
as in business, government, the military, and even the Catholic Church.
Office holders are not addressed as individuals, as would be expected in
conversations, but as part of a hierarchy of which that office is a part. Such
hierarchies tend to be described in terms of power relations. Through such
transitively unequal accounting practices, intra-organizational interactions
are

coordinated

organizational

and

directed

communication

towards
deviates

organizational goals. Thus,
markedly from

the

mutual

accountability in conversations and therefore deserves special attention. In
the social sciences, that attention largely comes from sociology, which
rarely acknowledges how organizational realities are reconstituted by
actors (Krippendorff, 2008b) and maintained in communication.
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Discourse as constrained conversation
.

:~

, I,
I'

:

To me discourse is what conversations can

become when

untoward

conversational moves are not accounted for or repaired. Discourse surfaces
when interactions become systematized, organized, institutionalized, and no
longer open to everything its participants may have to say; when dialogical
equality is replaced by asymmetrical communications; when the insistence on
consistencies constrains the possibilities that authentic conversations afford
their participants; and when self-organization (communicational closure) is
replaced by hierarchies of asymmetrical accounting practices outside the
present

interactions.

Elsewhere,

I have

written

about

'discourse

as

systematically constrained conversation' (Krippendorff, 2009:217-236) from
which I can outline here only its principal features.
To be clear, when saying that conversation descends, degenerates, or
erodes into discourse, I do not wish to imply that discourse is an undesirable
form of languaging. We know many discourses that have made contemporary
society more livable. We have reasons to be proud of scientific discourse,
public discourse, legal discourse, design discourse, and the discourse of
cybernetics (Krippendorff, 2008c), to name but a few. While these discourses
can be enormously productive, I do suggest that conversations open spaces for
people to

realize

each

other

as

human

beings,

that

conversational

competencies precede discursive practices developmentally (children need to
acquire conversational competencies before becoming competent in a
particular discourse), etymologically (the vocabularies of discourses tend to go
back to generations of speakers), and epistemologically (personal experiences
that enter conversations may become displaced by discursive constructions of
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reality). Therefore conversation should not be ignored when theorizing human
communication in general and human participation in social organizations
(Krippendorff, 2008b), science, and culture, in particular.
According to earlier distinctions, the five constitutive features of discourse are:

•

Discourses surface in the artifacts they construct, including the body of
their texts.

The discourse of physics constructs a logically consistent

universe amenable to observation and causal explanations, that of
medicine, diseased or debilitated human bodies open to cures or surgical
interventions, that of design, future technologies of everyday life.
Discourse-specific vocabularies are standardized building blocks for
constructing such artifacts. The body of artifacts that a discourse attends
to needs to remain open to rearticulation, recombination, and creative
extensions, or else the discourse dies for lack of space. Traditional
discourse analysts limit their attention to available texts. I maintain this to
be insufficient. Texts are read and embedded in talk among particular
people and acted upon. The artifacts that discourses generate include all of
their visible and somewhat enduring manifestations, not just texts but also
discourse-specific universes, professional practices, and technologies.
These artifacts are co-constructed in interpersonal interactions, which,
while inconceivable without individual cognition are not intelligible in
terms of cognitive processes.
However, unlike the traditional emphasis of discourse analysis, these artifacts
alone are not sufficient for understanding the operation of a discourse, hence
four additional features of discourse.

•

Discourses are kept alive within a community of their practitioners. Texts
need to be read, reread, reinterpreted, reconstructed, and updated by

J
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members of a discourse community specializing in that practice. Texts have

I

no meaning without readers and the artifacts of a discourse are rendered

,j

I
I

meaningful primarily by the members of a discourse community that
created and used them in their midst as well as by users outside the

1:
II
I

discourse. A discourse community is self-organizing by legitimizing its own

i

practices, including creating and maintaining standards for reading,

jl

writing, interpretation, and construction of their own realities, conditions
for membership in the discourse community, and criteria for attributing
meanings to the activities .of its members. For example, the medical
discourse community trains future members, certifies its practitioners,
determines codes of conduct and defines the criteria for good medical
research. All discourse communities are autonomous and pursue their
distinct identities.

•

Discourses institute their recurrent practices. This is to say that discoursespecific practices techniques,

media

courses of education, applicable methods and
of

publications,

awards

for

outstanding

accomplishments, etc. - are codified, institutionalized, and maintained as
the preferred practices of members of the discourse community and
maintained in the name of that community. Social science publications, for
example, are carefully evaluated by editors and reviewers, encourage a
common vocabulary, allow younger members to qualify for promotion,
and assure the efficiency of constructing discursive artifacts. Theorists
refer to their predecessors, research methods build on each other, and
intervention strategies are improved over time - creating a history of its
practices that avoids duplication of innovations, standardizes methods,
and thus serves to make the discourse more efficient.

'!
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•

Discourses draw their own boundaries, deciding who and what belongs and
what does not. Some discourses identify themselves by reference to
construction of a particular class of artifacts, biologists, for example, are
concerned with what they construct as living organisms; others are
committed to apply particular theories, physicists, for example, are
committed to causal explanations and the construction of a consistent
universe;

still

others are

dedicated

to

solve

particular

problems,

engineering, for example, seeking technological solutions to all kinds of
problems, including social ones.

•

Discourses justify their practices to outsiders. Justifications may be
motivated by the need to continually recruit new members for the
discourse community to remain viable, mobilize the resources necessary to
construct their artifacts and promote their use by others. But justifications
also provide the perhaps unintended ground for driving various discourse
dynamics. One may note discourses to compete with one another, as
science and religion did until the discourse of religion found a niche that
resists scientific

penetration. Some discourses consider themselves

foundationalist, like physics claiming that everything real is physical in
nature and everything else is inferior science or fiction. Some discourses
colonize others as cognitive science has been doing lately to psychology.

Computation

If discourse emerges when constraints on authentic conversation are
naturalized, talk becomes institutionalized, unequal accounting practices are
accepted and channeled into the construction of discursive artifacts; then the
implementation

of technological

solutions
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of social

problems

or the

-.
1
!

replacement of social practices by more efficient mechanism can be
considered a move from discourse to the entirely non-linguistic processes of
:

'.:

computation. Today, we are witnessing the massive translation of discursive

'

.1

i

practices into efficient computational mechanism: delegating repetitive work
to robotic devices, searching by search engines for relevant texts on the
internet, scheduling airplane traffic, letting computers buy and sell stocks,
online accounting for the essential variables of social organizations, and

,i!' '

automating whole businesses. In the same way, statistical software in the
social sciences has replaced seemingly endless and error prone hand

' I!

calculations by teams of researchers, and electronic banking accomplishes
what a social network of coordinated bank employees did before the advent of
computers. These replacements are driven by the increasing availability of
software, discursively developed by armies of collaborating programmers.
Software is written in a computer language and explicates algorithms,
i.e., step-by-step instructions in which all conceivable paths are anticipated
and by means of which receptive hardware can be programmed to be a
purposefully functioning machine. Much like in discourse, where it does not
matter who practices it as long as someone does, computation is not tied to
particular material manifestations as long as it works. In other words, the
material makeup of hardware is irrelevant to its proceeding from state to state
in a determinist fashion. Hence, software specifies a deterministic process,
rendering computers deterministic machines that cannot choose what they do.

II

They have no agency. Non-digital technologies - simple tools, cars, hospitals,

I
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public performances- may not be programmable as are computers, but their
design has always focused on how they go from here to there, what in the
digital world is called computation, hence my use of this term.
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All conversations, discourses, and computations produce something. The
products of conversations and discourses are still coordinated by talk, text, and
interactions. Computations, however, once initiated by human actors, run their
course unless intervened with at their interfaces. People may blindly accept
the results of computations and allow themselves to be affected by these
devices, but this is a user's choice, not a necessity.
Because of the difficulty of grasping the complexities of computational devices,
we often attribute human qualities to them - intelligence, temperaments,
likes, and dislikes (Turkle, 1984, 2007; Reeves & Nass, 1996) and the ability to
act (Latour, 2005). However, such attributions do not change the deterministic
nature of computational artifacts. One cannot hold computers accountable for
what they do. Therefore, replacing discursive practices by computational
technology and relying on them in everyday life amounts to a fundamental
shift away from human participation. It is truly amazing to realize how many
discourses depend on digitally mediated communication and computation and
how little the social sciences have conceptualized this fact of social life or
confused the two as Latour (2005) does. Here, cybernetics has much to explore
and many insights to offer.
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To sum up, Figure 1 depicts a continuum between the extremes of authentic
I

conversation and computation, populated by discourse formations of varying
degrees of rigor. Conversational competencies includes, as I suggested, the
ability to repair untoward moves that speakers may make, which can bring
discourses back to conversations and the latter to authentic ones. But by not
repairing problematic encounters when they occur, by consenting to limited
accountabili~y

for problematic actions, conversations unwittingly drift into

discursive forms that may well construct realities of a kind that conversations
cannot - think of sophisticated information systems, highways, and the
infrastructure of cities. The evolution of such .artifacts is accomplished by
discourses that coordinate large numbers of human participants, including
over some time. It follows that social artifacts of such complexity cannot
possibly be explained by the cognitive constructions by an observer or by any
one of its participating creators. What participants do know is their own
creative but always only partial contributions. The remainder consists of trust

: I

168

in the linguistic competence of the other participants to coordinate their
understanding and interact towards what is to be done. In the transition from
conversation to discourse, conversational possibilities are traded for practical
conveniences. In the transition from discourse to computation, seemingly
costly, unpleasant, or inefficient discursive practices are implemented in
mechanisms whose ultimate consequences may be difficult to foresee.
I am suggesting that the move from conversation through the large domain of
discursive forms is attracted by the ultimate temptation of turning social
processes into productive algorithms whose operation in various technologies
is no longer social, except before their inception and subsequently at
occasional interventions through multi-user interfaces with them. Since
computational artifacts often are beyond individual understanding of how they
work, such technologies can no longer be treated as tools under rational
control of their creators and users. Uncritical reliance on computation can lead
affected communities into unintended realities that may well become
unbearable to live in and therefore constitute an important domain of
scholarly and designerly attention.
This essay is intended to expand into the domain of the social the kind of
cognitive constructivism that is confined to individual understanding and make
less attractive the epistemological position of observers at the expense of
participatory and interactive reality constructions. I maintain that human
realities, including the idea of cognition, are conversational or discursive
realities in the sense that we humans interactively participate in their
construction - without being in charge or fully cognizant of each other's
conceptions, except for our contribution to them.
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1 hope that readers of this essay consider conversation -

not individual

cognition and efforts to describe one's observations- as the essentially human
way of living together. Following from that is to become aware of the often
casually accepted drift from conversation through various discursive forms to
computation. 1 am inviting readers to draw finer distinctions within the domain
of discourses and reflect on how their own contributions affect the spaces left
to exercise accountability along this sometimes appealing journey. Although
computation deserves more attention than I could devote here, it should be
recognizable as what early cybernetics thrived on and proposed in the form of
theories, models, and mechanisms for augmenting social reality. Computation
undoubtedly can vastly expand the horizon of our abilities, but it can also
constrain human agency. When moving through various discourses, converting
recurrent social practices into computational artifacts, we should always
preserve the possibility of returning to authentic conversation, its sheer

·.i
I,

pleasure and fundamental humanness.
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